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ABSTRACT: Notwithstanding their technical virtuosity and
growing presence in mainstream thinking, game theoretic log-
ics have attracted a sceptical question: “Granted that logic can be
done game theoretically, but what would justify the idea that this
is the preferred way to do it?” A recent suggestion is that at least
part of the desired support might be found in the Greek dialecti-
cal writings. If so, perhaps we could say that those works possess
a kind of foundational signiﬁcance. The relation of being founda-
tional for is interesting in its own right. In this paper, I explore
its ancient applicability to relevant, paraconsistent and nonmono-
tonic logics, before returning to the question of its ancestral tie,
or want of one, to the modern logics of games.
1. LOGIC AND GAME THEORY
Since its inception in the early 1940s (von Neumann & Morgenstern
1944),1 the mathematical theory of games has become something of
a boom industry, with a sophisticated and ever expanding literature
in many areas of the physical and biological sciences, the behavioural
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and social sciences, the formal and computational sciences, and various
branches of philosophy.2 In its appropriation by logic,3 the game theo-
retic orientation has two essential features. The ﬁrst is that the logical
particles - quantiﬁers for example - are speciﬁed by the rules governing
how a player in a win-lose game responds to sentences in which the
particle in question has a dominant occurrence, depending on which
role in the game he occupies. The rules for this are widely referred
to as the logical rules different rules for different roles. Consider, for
example, the universal quantiﬁer ∀. Its game theoretic provisions are
given as follows: Let A[x] be a formula, with x’s occurrence possibly
free. Then when one party advances ∀x A[x], the opposing party se-
lects a constant a for x and challenges the ﬁrst party to defend A[x/a].
Thesecond feature of the game theoretic approach is that the logic’s
metalogical properties - truth in a model, valid consequence, etc. - are
game theoretically deﬁnable via the concept of a winning strategy. For
example, given the axiom of choice it is provable that a ﬁrst order sen-
tence A is true in a model M in the standard truth conditional sense of
Tarski just in case there is a winning strategy for the defender of A in a
game G(M) (Hodges 1983). The rules that generate winning strategies
also include the game’s organizational and attack-and-defend rules;
the rules of procedure. Here, too, there are different rules for different
roles. These are commonly known as the structural rules.
We now have a simple way of characterizing a game theoretic logic.
It is a logic governed by these kinds of logical and structural rules.
2. A QUESTION AND A CHALLENGE
My project is motivated by a sceptical question posed by Wilfrid Hodges
and a hopeful challenge issued by Mathieu Marion (Hodges (2004);
Marion (2009). The challenge is intended to play a role in arriving at
a response to the question. So I begin with the question.
Hodges’ Question: In his Stanford Encylopedia entry on logic and
games, Hodges writes:
In most applications of logical games, the central notion
is that of a winning strategy for [the proponent]. Often
these strategies (or their existence) turn out to be equiv-
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alent to something of logical importance that could have
been deﬁned without using games - for example a proof.
But games are felt to give a better deﬁnition because they
quite literally supply some motivation: [the proponent] is
trying to win. This raises a question that is not of much in-
terest mathematically, but it should concern philosophers
who use logical games. If we want [the proponent’s] mo-
tivation in a game G to have any explanatory value, then
we need to understand what is achieved if [the proponent]
does win. In particular, we should be able to tell a realistic
story of a situation in which some agent called [the propo-
nent] is trying to do something intelligible, and doing it is
the same thing as winning a game. (Hodges 2004 §2)4
Hodges goes on to say that to the best of his knowledge no satisfactory
answer has yet been found (Hodges 2001, 2004, 2006).
I am not quite sure what question Hodges is asking. (He is cer-
tainly not asking what made it intelligible that Wellington should have
been motivated to prevail against Napoleon in the Battle of Waterloo).
But here is a possibility we might consider.   is a formalized quantiﬁ-
cational language and X is an arbitrarily selected logician wishing to
write a semantics for  . Accordingly, X sets out to deﬁne  ’s logical
operators and, thereupon, to characterize  ’s further semantic prop-
erties. This is a perfectly intelligible motivation for X, and, of course, X
will have some fairly clear conception of what he is about as he moves
through this semantic agenda. Suppose now that X understands his
own semantic behaviour as playing a win-lose game with an opponent.
Notice that Hodges is not asking why a game theoretic logician might
characterize himself in this way. A game theoretic logician would char-
acterize himself in that way because that’s what he is. That’s the course
he has already chosen to take. But, by construction of the present case,
the subject of Hodges’ sceptical question is any logician whomever. In
which case, the question attains some purchase. But it gets its traction
at a price. The price is that the question is not a serious one. What
is the point of asking why, when semanticizing   in the manner of,
say, Tarski, would a logician conceive himself as playing the rules of
a win-lose game? That was the last thing that Tarski took himself to
be doing. Why, then, would we think that Tarski’s efforts lacked an
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intelligible motivation?
Perhaps I have got this all wrong. No matter; there is still a perfectly
serious question occasioned by Hodges’ remarks, if not formulated by
them. I rather think that it is this unvoiced question that prompts Mar-
ion’s challenge. It is a question that asks for a justiﬁcation of a logician’s
preferences for semanticizing   in the game theoretic way. From this
point on, this is what I shall mean by “Hodges’ question”. It is also an
interpretation discernible in the title of Marion’s paper “Why play logic
games?” Let’s turn to that now (Marion 2009).
Marion’s challenge: Marion writes as follows:
Lorenzen referred en passant to the practice of refutation
or ‘dialectics’ in Ancient Greece as both the original mo-
tivation for the development of logic and as a source for
dialogical logic. This suggestion, which looks merely like
a rhetorical ﬂourish, was not, as far as I know, followed
up by the scholarly investigation that it clearly deserves ...
(Marion 2009, p. 18)5
That these remarks should have occurred in a paper of this title clearly
enough suggests that theorigins of game theoretic logic might be traced
to the beginnings of logic itself. The suggestion is conﬁrmed lines later:
“At all events, my point is merely to indicate that Greek dialectics al-
ready contain elements of an answer to Hodges’ question” (Marion
2009, p. 19). Marion’s challenge calls for the scholarship that might
verify Lorenzen’s conjecture, thereby enabling a scepticism-removing
reply to Hodges’s demand for a justiﬁcation.
3. VERIFICATIONISM
Game theoretic semantics reﬂects a certain kind of philosophical ori-
entation, in regard to which the name of Wittgenstein is frequently
invoked. On this approach the meaning of a linguistic object - a sen-
tence say - is determined by its use.6 It is constituted by a linguistic
practice. There are, of course, a great many different kinds of linguis-
tic practice. So varied are they that the concept of linguistic practice,
like the concept of game, refuses to yield to an all-embracing deﬁni-
tion.7 This, the general idea, is open to various adaptations. One is
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to relativize the linguistic practices that ﬁx the meaning of a sentence
S to those procedures or methods that verify or disverify it.8 Further
adaptations are also possible, one of which is motivated by an obvi-
ous question about veriﬁcationism: How are meaningful sentences to
be accounted for when they lack a settled veriﬁcation-disveriﬁcation
methodology? On a strict reading of veriﬁcationism, such sentences
aren’t meaningful after all. On a gentler and more plausible reading,
we replace the alethic concepts of veriﬁcation and disveriﬁcation - that
is, of showing-true and showing-false with the pragmatic concepts of
defence and attack, and likewise replace the properties of truth and
falsity with the pragmatic properties of victory (successful attack or
defence) and defeat (unsuccessful attack or defence). Since perhaps
the most usual way of managing our attack and defend practices is
by way of conversational exchanges between the contending parties, a
further reﬁnement beckons. It is that the practices that confer mean-
ing upon the sentences of our language have an inherently dialogical
character. This, we might say, gives a reconceptualized version of the
veriﬁcationist theory of meaning. It is a dialogicized adaptation of it,
in which truth, the alethic property, drops out in favour of victory, the
pragmatic property.
It is worth repeating that a major virtue of this dialogical approach
to meaning is that it provides a way of preserving the spirit of veriﬁ-
cationism without having to endure the massive semantic scepticism
occasioned by a strict interpretation of it.9 It allows for large classes
of meaningful sentences whose veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation lie beyond
our reach or are otherwise impossible.
We see in this the unmistakable presence of the concept of a game,
or anyhow of an attack-and-defend contest,10 or dialectic as the an-
cients would say. There then is a clear intuitive sense in which a di-
alecticized veriﬁcationism is a semantics oriented to games. But it is
not yet a game theoretic semantics in the modern sense. It would not
be a game theoretic semantics unless it were powered by the logical
and structural rules mentioned above.
It is not my purpose to presume for these reﬂections any very direct
causal signiﬁcance. I have no inclination to suppose that when in 1961
Henkin adapted game theory to logic that he was motivated by a veri-
ﬁcationist semantics or that his aim was to give it a pragmatic retroﬁt.
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Even so, it would not be wrong to note that a pragmaticized veriﬁca-
tionism is an attractive conceptual space within which to achieve the
further reﬁnements of dialectiﬁcation. Dialectiﬁcation, in turn, gives
rise to a good and necessary question: what are the prospects for a di-
alectiﬁed theory of meaning short of its attainment of a full-bore game
theoretic status?
All I will say for now is that a dialecticized veriﬁcationism is indeed
a natural harbour for the game theoretic mariner. Whatever else might
be said I reserve for the ﬁnal section of the paper.
4. DIALOGUES
Greek dialectics had a substantial history before the arrival of Aristo-
tle.11 But since it is widely accepted that Aristotle is the originator of
systematic logic and its ﬁrst talented metatheorist, I take the liberty
of reﬁning Lorenzen’s conjecture and Marion’s challenge: The begin-
nings of game theoretic logic are in Aristotle, and conﬁrmation of this
would provide the wherewithal to calm Hodges’ concerns. Since Mar-
ion thinks that the scholarship required to achieve this conﬁrmation
has yet to be done, he also thinks that logicians of game theoretic bent
have an interest in the repair of this omission.
It is important to see that the lack-of-scholarship claim is a local-
ized regret. There is lots of scholarship about the logics of the Prior
and Posterior Analytics,12 and a good deal of it regarding Aristotle’s var-
ious uncompleted forays into modal logic.13 But what seems missing
is the same sort of attention to the “immature”14 or early logic of Top-
ics and On Sophistical Refutations, the two places in which dialectical
considerations are given a wholly central role.15 So we have a further
reﬁnement of the conjecture and the challenge: The logic of Topics and
On Sophistical Refutations is the starting point of game theoretic logic,
and we should do the scholarship necessary to show it.
Let me note in passing that Marion’s call for scholarship not yet
produced should not blind us to the existence of scholarly support for
the idea that origins of logic are dialectical or, more broadly, dialog-
ical,16 and for the related proposition that the founding conception
of logic calls for an interrogational formatting of the subject. Neither
should it cause us to forget that Jaakko Hintikka, a leading proponent
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of such linkages is himself one of game theoretic logic’s most active
practitioners.17 However, as we saw, dialogue logics, interrogative log-
ics, or even dialectical logics are not intrinsically game theoretic logics.
No such logic has a game theoretic character unless it is governed by
logical and structural rules of the kind described in section 1. Now
that’s a rather stringent condition; and it is not surprising that there
would be logics of this general sort that don’t fulﬁll it.
This gives us two options to consider. One is that in advancing his
dialectical origins thesis, Hintikka does indeed invest ancient logic with
game theoretic purport. In which case, Marion is wrong about the ab-
sence of scholarship in this area, and yet Hodges - and by extension,
Marion too - could be right in thinking that Hintikka’s rationale for pre-
ferring the game theoretic approach is unconvincing.18 If that were so,
Marion’s challenge could be revised: Go back to the scholarship and see
if you can see in Aristotle’s early writings a better rationale for game
theoretic preferences than the one that Hintikka himself may have ex-
tracted from them. The second option is that Hintikka did intend to
construe Aristotle’s logic as a logic of games, but without giving it a
game theoretic characterization in the modern sense. In which case,
the rationale for game theoretic preferences which Hintikka actually
gives and which Hodges resists would be separate from the rationale
Marion thinks might be found in dialectic.
5. FOUNDATIONALITY
In the sections to follow I want to pause, and to reserve consideration
of game theoretic matters, concentrating instead on a description of
Aristotle’s logic as he formulates it in these texts. In the sections after
that, the game theoretic question can be re-opened and, I hope, settled.
I am temporarily dropping the question of Aristotle’s game theoreticity
not to evade it, but rather to prepare the ground for answering it. I
want to approach the question of what is to be found in Aristotle’s
logic unencumbered by preconceptions of what our search will reveal.
Before moving on, this would be a good place to indicate some
of the questions that I am not asking in this paper. I am not asking
whether the logic of the early writings admits of reinterpretation in
a game theoretic one, either extant or purpose-built. I am not ask-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Ancestor Worship in The Logic of Games 8
ing whether there is a generic notion of game ﬂoating about in Topics
and On Sophistical Refutations. What I am asking is whether there is
recognizable in these writings a notion of game that anticipates in an
appropriately robust way the notion to which von Neumann and Mor-
genstern gave expression in 1944. I am asking whether the logic of
these texts is of foundational signiﬁcance for game theoretic logic. I
am asking whether the notion of game theoreticity was in Aristotle’s
logical DNA.
It might be thought that asking this foundational question of Aris-
totle pretty much guarantees it a negative answer. If it did, that would
not be the fault of the question. The question is the right question.
If there were no plausible case for thinking that, however inchoately
and tentatively, Aristotle was working a game theoretic agenda, what
promise could there be for the idea that it is Aristotle’s logic that grounds
a satisfactory justiﬁcation of modern game theoretic preferences?19
It is also important to stress that this interest in the ancients is not
an antiquarian one. We are looking to Aristotle in hopes of making
some headway with a contemporary problem of logical theory. So it
is only natural that we would try to determine how good a logic Aris-
totle’s is and whether its founder has bequeathed to his distant heirs
anything of enduring logical value, apart from its game theoretic sig-
niﬁcance or lack of it. I daresay that this, too, will strike a good many
logicians as too much to ask, a question wholly without prospect of
an afﬁrmative answer.20 My opinion is that we should follow Marion’s
advice: Look, and then see.
6. ARISTOTLE’S EARLY LOGIC
A proper understanding of Aristotle’s logic requires a distinction be-
tween in my words, not his arguments in the broad sense and argu-
ments in the narrow sense. There is a corresponding difference be-
tween a theory of argument in the broad sense and a theory of argu-
ment in the narrow sense. Arguments in the broad sense are social
events. They are structured by interactive exchanges of speech acts by
two or more parties. Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of arguments
in the broad sense. They are refutation arguments, instruction argu-
ments, examination arguments and demonstration arguments. The
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central focus of the early writings is on refutation arguments,21 and
they will be our focus here. Aristotle calls refutation arguments “di-
alectical” arguments. So I will call the theory of such arguments dialec-
tic. The word “dialectical” has a tangled usage in Greek. In Aristotle’s
case, it is in all its senses a technical term Woods & Hansen (2004).
For our purposes here it sufﬁces to give it the sense that it currently
carries in present-day argumentation theory. Accordingly, an argument
in the broad sense is a dialectical argument when it is a contest be-
tween dialogue-partners over some disputed proposition in which each
participant has the objective of prevailing against the other.
Arguments in the narrow sense stand starkly apart. They are not so-
cial events. They are not events of any kind. They are ﬁnite sequences
of linguistic objects which Aristotle calls propositions. When they meet
certain conditions, they are syllogisms. The terminal member of a syl-
logism is its conclusion, and the remaining members its premisses. It is
generally agreed that Aristotle understands a syllogism to have exactly
two premisses.
A syllogism is a valid deduction satisfying some further require-
ments: (1) Its conclusion may not repeat a premiss or any statement
immediately implying it. That is, the argument must be non-circular.
(2) There may be no redundant premisses. That is, all premisses must
be load-bearing. (3) The premisses must be internally and mutually
consistent. That is, inconsistent premisses yield no syllogistic conclu-
sions. (4) There may not be multiple conclusions.22
Aristotle is the originator of the syllogism. Its originality is some-
thing that he stresses and is evidently proud of.
When it comes to this subject [the syllogism] it is not the
case that part had been worked out in advance and part
not; instead nothing [before it] existed at all. (Soph. Ref.
183b, 34-36; emphasis added)
Syllogisms were to play a breakthrough role in the management of
a vexing problem with arguments in the broad sense. The problem
is that these arguments instantiate the appearance-reality distinction.
Good-looking arguments are often bad, and bad-looking arguments are
sometimes good. The problem is that up to now there has been no prin-
cipled and suitably general way to regulate this distinction, hence no
reasonable prospect of constructing a sound general theory of argu-
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ments in the broad sense. But with the new idea of syllogisms now
in hand, Aristotle thinks that prospects improve signiﬁcantly. He will
give to syllogisms a core role in a general theory of two-person, psy-
chologically real, real-time arguments. I will illustrate how this works
for dialectical arguments.
A dialectical argument is a dialogue about a disputed proposition
called a thesis (T). It is a contest between a supporter of T (the propo-
nent) and a rejector of it (the opponent). Once T has been advanced by
its proponent P , the lead-role passes to the opponent O. At each stage
of the dialogue, it is O’s task to put to P a single question which admits
of a complete answer: Yes or No. The propositional content of that
response then becomes available to O for future use, to be described
immediately below. So it is necessary for the parties to keep track of
these propositions.
O has a second task to perform. He must attempt to produce a
syllogism whose conclusion is the contradictory, not-T, of P’s initial the-
sis.23 A restriction on this syllogism is that all its premisses are to be
drawn from the inventory of those propositions conceded by P in re-
sponding to O’s Yes-No questions. When these conditions are met, the
syllogism that O constructs is a refutation of the disputed thesis.
A dialectical argument is an argument in the broad sense. The
opponent’s role in it is to produce an argument in the narrow sense
- that is, a syllogism - in fulﬁllment of these further conditions. A
refutation is the syllogism that wins a dialectical argument for O. When
this happens, the loser P stands convicted “out of his own mouth”. It
is a clever requirement. It ensures that no premiss of a refutation ever
begs the question against its proponent.
It is easy to see that the refutation of a thesis 〈A, B, not-T〉 does not
establish its falsity. The most that the refutation discloses is the falsity
of at least one member of the set {A, B, T}. But there is nothing in the
structure of these proceedings that allows us to pick out the falsity(ies)
within. What the refutation shows is that T is not consistently assert-
ible by P in the context of the very dialogue, D, in which P asserted
it. It shows that P has made an inconsistent defence of T in D. In so
saying, we come to an important feature of Aristotle’s dialectical logic.
A dialectical success is not, just so, an alethic success.
In various places Aristotle characterizes refutations as ad hominem
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proofs. In so saying, he achieves an insight into ad hominem argumen-
tation that has eluded virtually every modern writer with an interest
in such matters.24 Aristotle sees that an ad hominem argument can be
a legitimate defeater of a thesis well short of showing it to be false,
hence without its being a proof “in the full sense.” One defeats the
thesis by inducing its supporter to spoil his own defence of it. In the
Socratic literature, refutations are considered negative elenchi (Vlas-
tos 1982).25 Given the refutation 〈A, B, not-T〉, Aristotle thinks that
the inconsistency of {A, B, T} constitutes a refutation of T, not of A
or B. The inconsistency “pins the blame” on T, notwithstanding that it
doesn’t convict T of falsity. What justiﬁes his singling out T in this way?
Since Aristotle does not address this question directly, he provides no
straightforward answer to it. That he thinks a refutation is a negative
elenchus is amply present in his insistence that a refutation of T is not a
proof against it “in the full sense”, but rather a proof against the person
who holds it. Even so, the early writings provide the wherewithal for a
dialectical answer to our question.
One of the requirements of dialectical argument is that answers
may not be retracted. Call this the no-retraction rule. There is a reason
for this. If answers could be retracted strategically, they could be pulled
out of contention at any point in the argument at which their presence
portends damage to the answerer’s thesis. Strategic withdrawal is pre-
cluded by three of the dialectical rules of procedure. One is that ques-
tions must be answered honestly. Another is that a proponent’s only
move is to answer a Yes-No question afﬁrmatively or negatively. He
cannot retract T unless there is an askable Yes-No question, a negative
answer to which is directly inconsistent with T. But, thirdly, if this hap-
pens, it violates the rule that answers may not contradict one another.
It bears on this that the only concession that is eligible for P to make
is T itself. This is because P’s endorsement of T occurs independently of
any question his opponent asks of him in an argument that is occasioned
by that prior espousal. By process of elimination, when P lands himself
in a pickle generated by the inconsistency of {A, B, T}, T is the only
proposition eligible for retraction. So the blame is pinned on T by the
dialectical rules of refutation arguments. We may say, then, that when
〈A, B, not-T〉 is a syllogism that the refuted proposition T is dialectically
individuated.
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It is well to emphasize that a refutation is a syllogism. It owes noth-
ing of its identity as a syllogism to dialectical considerations. It does
however owe its identity as a refutationto dialectical considerations. As
we see, a refutation’s dialectical features sufﬁce for the individuation
of the thesis that it refutes. It would be interesting to see whether this
identiﬁcation might be also achieved by way of a refutation’s syllogistic
features. Let us see.
When 〈A, B, not-T〉 is a refutation of P’s thesis T, then {A, B, T} is an
inconsistent set, and {A, B}, {A, T} and B, T are its maximal consistent
subsets. This we know because, by the structure of the syllogism, pre-
misses must be internally and pairwise consistent, and no premiss can
give not-T in one fell swoop. So {A, T} and {B, T} must also be consis-
tent. That they are maximal is shown by the inconsistency of {A, B, T},
which is what the addition to each of these subsets of the proposition
that is missing produces.
Let us say that a maximal consistent subset of {A, B, T} is excluded
by a refutation 〈A, B, not-T〉 just in case it doesn’t syllogistically imply
the refutation’s conclusion. So deﬁned, {A, B} is not excluded by 〈A, B,
not-T〉, but each of {A, T} and {B, T} is. Indeed T is the proposition re-
futed by 〈A, B, not-T〉 because it is the sole member of the intersection
of all maximal subsets of {A, B, T} excluded by the refutation. Thus it
would appear that the positive refutation thesis can be upheld on syllo-
gistic grounds. We might even say that it is syllogistically individuated.
It is important to see that in these writings Aristotle is drawing
upon two different theories of argument. One is a theory of narrow
arguments. The other is a theory of broad arguments. The narrow
theory is the logic of syllogisms. It is a logic entirely free of dialecti-
cal characterization. Let us repeat the point that calling a syllogism a
refutation is giving it a dialectical characterization. But it is not a char-
acterization that the narrow logic, the logic of syllogisms, can bestow.
It is not in the vocabulary of the logic of syllogisms to call a syllogism
a refutation even when it is one. We need the vocabulary of a theory
of broad argument to call a syllogism that. The broad theory, typiﬁed
by the theory of refutation, has an even larger theoretical range, ex-
tending to any form of dialogue whose logic embeds the syllogistic as a
partner logic. But for our purposes dialectic can stand in for them all.
It remains only to add that Aristotle thinks that the logic of syllogisms
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and the dialectic involve quite different conceptions of argument. The
term “logic” didn’t arise until late in the second century A.D.26 Aristotle
instead speaks of “analytics”, which he reserves for the narrow logic.
This is not a matter of baptismal haphazardness. In the distinction
between analytic and dialectic Aristotle intends a difference in kind.
The distinction between dialectic and analytic (or logic) is clear
in Aristotle.27 In later writings, including those of the present day,
the distinction is often blurred. But it is not non-existent. Provided
we attend to the relevant differences perhaps there is no great harm
in distinguishing between Aristotle’s dialectical logic and his syllogistic
logic. But we should not lose sight of the point that these are disjoint
conceptions of logic.
Aristotle’s breakthrough insight was the discovery that dialectic can-
not succeed without a properly wrought partnership with logic. He
thought that the partnership couldn’t succeed if the deep differences in
kind between arguments in the broad sense and arguments in the nar-
row sense weren’t duly heeded. Neither could it succeed in the absence
of a clear-eyed appreciation of the deep differences in kind between the
“logic” of arguments in the broad sense and the logic of arguments in
the narrow sense. Still, for all their differences, the partnership is an
intimate one. The logic of syllogism will be the indispensable theoret-
ical core - indeed a proper part - of a successful dialectic of arguments
in the broad sense.
Even so, the distinction between dialectical and syllogistic logic en-
genders a complication. Marion’s challenge is now two challenges.
One is to search the ancient records to see whether Aristotle’s dialec-
tical logic is foundational for modern game theoretic logic. The other
is to determine whether these roots are discernible in the syllogistic.
The same is true of Marion’s optimistic suggestion that the search will
prove successful. It is now an ambiguous optimism. In what follows, it
behooves us to keep these complications in mind.
7. FALLACIES
Let me return to the point that, with his contemporaries and predeces-
sors, Aristotle was worried about the appearance-reality distinction. It
is a given that sometimes things aren’t in reality as they appear to be.
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The general problem posed by this is how to regulate the distinction
between being and appearing to be in a suitably general and principled
way. As applied to arguments, there are good-looking arguments that
aren’t good in reality, and bad-looking arguments that are in fact good.
Aristotle thought that a suitably powerful general theory of argument
would be one that dealt effectively with the distinction between actu-
ally good and merely good-looking arguments.
As we saw, Aristotle contrived the logic of syllogisms to play a cen-
tral and load-bearing role in this general theory. As was evident from
the goings on in the agora and the councils of government, disputations
often descend into wrangles, and even on those occasions when they
appear to have been settled, the appearance of settlement isn’t always
the real thing. In the matter of refutation, Aristotle thought that the
appearance-reality distinction could be regulated by the presence or
absence in an apparent refutation of a properly constructed syllogism.
Syllogisms were purpose-built to make the appearance-reality dis-
tinction for arguments a manageable one. A refutation would be “so-
phistical” if it lacked the bona ﬁdes of a syllogism. As its title suggests,
in On Sophistical Refutations all is not well with the logic of refuta-
tion.28 An argument can appear to be a syllogism without being one in
fact. Aristotle calls such arguments paralogismoi or “fallacies”. Falla-
cies are arguments that evade the discipline of the appearance-reality
distinction for arguments. The irony of this cannot have been lost on
Aristotle. Syllogisms were invoked to dispel appearance-reality con-
fusions but, as we now see, this is the very confusion to which they
themselves sometimes fall.
This matters for dialectical logic. Aristotle sees a would-be refuta-
tion as sophistical when it is fallacious; that is, when it has the look but
not the reality of a syllogism.29 Much of On Sophistical Refutations is
a discussion of the various ways in which a non-syllogism might take
on the look of a syllogism. Aristotle lists thirteen of the ways in which
this confusion can arise: They are: equivocation, amphiboly, combina-
tion of words, division of words, accent, forms of expression, secundum
quid, consequent, non-cause as cause, begging the question and many
questions. There arises now a challenge of considerable difﬁculty. It is
to establish an essential connection between two kinds of argumenta-
tional misperformance. On the one hand, it is necessary to expose the
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conditions under which the thirteen pathologies on Aristotle’s list are
instantiated. It is also necessary to show that, when a would-be refuta-
tion instantiates such a pathology, this fact is necessary and sufﬁcient
for conferral of the appearance of syllogisity on arguments that aren’t
in fact syllogisms.
It is a heavy burden, with respect to which Aristotle himself makes
next to no progress. This alone is reason to wonder whether the es-
sential connection between the thirteen pathologies and the fallacy of
mistaking a non-syllogism for a syllogism can actually be established.
Consider a case. If an opponent seeks to score against his adversary
by extracting from him an admission of dog-beating, it is unavailing
to ask, “Are you still a dog-beater?” At least, it is unavailing to ask it
under the requirement that the answer must be either Yes or No. If
it is Yes, the point is scored. But if the answer is No, the position its
answerer has conceded let’s simply assume the answerer possesses a
dog is that either he didn’t beat his dog in the past, or did but doesn’t
now, or didn’t and still doesn’t. It is not an admission that excludes the
very point that the questioner wishes to score. It generates an answer
which leaves it unproved that the answerer is indeed a dog-beater. So
while it denies the answerer a defence against the charge, the answer it
receives leaves the questioner’s intended point unscored. The question
was both unfair to the answerer and unavailing for the questioner. It
was the wrong question to ask.30
It also happens that it was a syllogistically inadmissible question.
The statement conveyed by its No-answer fails to be a categorical propo-
sition. It is unavailable for premissory work in any syllogism the ques-
tioner might have it in mind to construct. However, the point to empha-
size is that the dialectical ineffectuality of the question owes nothing
to its ineffectuality in generating a syllogically allowable premiss for
the answerer’s subsequent use. What makes the question dialectically
ineffectual does not depend on whether its asker has any syllogistic de-
signs upon it. That being so, a question is not a damage free maneuver
in the many questions sophism simply because it does not lend itself to
inclusion in a would-be syllogism premissed in part by the question’s
No answer.
This is not to say that Aristotle can’t reinstate the connection he
seeks by ﬁat. This is, in fact, precisely what he does in the early writ-
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ings. Aristotle stipulates that a refutation is a syllogism meeting certain
conditions. Accordingly, we have it at once that no argument that fails
to be a syllogism can succeed as a refutation. Aristotle further stipu-
lates that a fallacy is an argument that has the false appearance of a
syllogism. A third stipulation is that a would-be refutation is sophisti-
cal when it is such as to occasion the false appearance of a syllogism in
an argument that fails to be one. In our present example, the fallacy
sophistically achieved by many questions consists entirely in masking
or rendering unapparent the fact that it does not achieve a syllogistic
refutation by means of the premissory employment of a No-answer.
This is getting to be an odd tangle of stipulations. Intuitively, the
impropriety of many questions inheres in its unfairness to the answerer
and its dialectical impotence for the asker. Intuitively, the question is
bad dialectics even before it receives an answer and notwithstanding
the questioner’s further designs upon it once made. If the same were
true of the twelve other pathologies on Aristotle’s list, we would have
it that Aristotle’s list of the fallacies fails to instantiate his own concept
of them.31 But Aristotle wants to give his invention a central and load-
bearing role in dialectic. He wants dialectic to pivot on logic. And so it
does in these writings; but it does so by Aristotle’s contrivance.
The fallacies project arose with the very birth of logic itself. It was
not an easy birth. Some would go further: it was a still-birth. The
history of logic attests to this in a number of ways, two of which I’ll
mention here. One is the recurring tendency among commentators on
Aristotle’s fallacies programme to interpret it as a dialectical project, in
a sense of “dialectical” that sets it apart from logic.32 The other, not
unrelated, historical indication is reﬂected in two further facts about
the programme. Aristotle himself did little to bring it to theoretical
maturity,33 and so too the programme’s successors, a point lamented in
Charles Hamblin’s Fallacies (1970).34 Indeed, as logic has evolved not
excluding the expanding markets for dialogic logic the fallacies project
has largely dropped from view. (When did a paper on the fallacies last
appear in the Journal of Symbolic Logic?)35
What this suggests is that the mischief actually done by Aristotle’s
thirteen pathologies has nothing inherently to do with logic in the nar-
row sense. Even so, Aristotle fashions an attachment by ﬁat. Aristotle
didn’t set out to dialecticize logic. He invented logic to logicize dialec-
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tic. If this is right, it is a primacy to respect before reaching a judgment
about Aristotle’s game theoretic bona ﬁdes.
8. CONSEQUENCE HAVING AND DRAWING
Like all logics, the central focus of syllogistic logic is the consequence
relation, called by Aristotle necessitation. Strangely enough, necessi-
tation is primitive in Aristotle’s logic. Aristotle’s focus is on what we
might call syllogistic consequence. In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle is
quite explicit about the distinction. A valid argument is anagkaion,
and sullogismos is a special case of anagkaion (Pr. An. A 32, 47a). Syl-
logistic consequence is the necessitation relation under the constraints
that deﬁne syllogisms. It is an open question as to how closely ne-
cessitation resembles modern notions of consequence, e.g. classical
consequence. In fact, for the purposes of syllogistic logic, it can be
any relation that meets the demands of truth-preservation. If we make
the not implausible assumption that none of Aristotle’s syllogistically
deﬁning properties need be required for necessitation, necessitation
certainly could be classical. The point is that the syllogistic conditions
are sharply constraining ones. Here is why.
Implicit in these writings is a distinction between consequence-
having and consequence-drawing. In a great many systems of mod-
ern logic, it is taken as given that any consequence of any premisses
accepted by a reasoner is a consequence he should draw. This is a lu-
dicrous requirement for real-life reasoners. For one thing, there are
inﬁnitely too many of them, and, for another, vanishingly few of them
would have any conceivable interest for or would confer any conceiv-
able beneﬁt on their drawers. This has generated a separatist move-
ment in logic: A logic of consequence-having is one thing. A logic of
consequence-drawing is another. Accordingly, if there are logics of such
things, they will have to be different logics. (Separate, but equally log-
ics, so to speak). A further option is to close the gap between having
and drawing by normativizing the consequence-having rules for ideal
reasoners In which case, the ideal reasoner would close his beliefs un-
der consequence.36
That Aristotle has no deﬁnition of consequence suggests that his en-
tire orientation in the early writings is on consequence-drawing, that is,
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on the sort of consequence-drawing appropriate to dialectical contexts.
This he achieves by ﬁrst deﬁning a restricted notion of consequence -
syllogistic consequence - and then by closing the gap between having a
syllogistic consequence and drawing it. This is entirely an outcome of
how syllogisms are structured. Essential to this gap-closing is Aristotle’s
insistence that the propositions from which syllogisms are constructed
be what would later be called categorical propositions, propositions in
the classical A, E, I and O formats. This, too, is a harsh constraint, for
which, beginning with the Stoics, Aristotle would be rebuked. But, it is
no ad hoc contrivance. Aristotle thinks that every statement of Greek
can be re-expressed without relevant loss in the language of categorical
propositions.37
The net effect on the question before us of the conditions that trans-
form valid arguments into syllogisms is this: For any arbitrarily selected
pair of propositions, hardly any has syllogistic consequences at all; and
when they do, the consequences are never more than two. Aristotle
requires that a syllogism contain exactly three terms, each of which
occurs exactly twice (but not in the same proposition). This, together
with the two-premiss limitation and one-conclusion rule, greatly in-
hibits syllogistic output. If C is the syllogistic conclusion of premisses
A, B, it is their only conclusion unless a further proposition D is imme-
diately implied by C by subsumption or immediately equivalent to it
by conversion. Thus if C is “All Greeks are mortal”, D could be “Some
Greeks are mortal”. If C is “Some felines are cats”, D is “Some cats are
felines.” This tightened syllogistic structure serves to close the gap be-
tween consequence-having and consequence-drawing. Under the syl-
logistic constraints, it is wholly reasonable to require the accepter of
a syllogism’s premisses to draw every syllogistic consequence of them.
Accordingly, the idea that logic should serve two masters at once - hav-
ing and drawing - receives its ﬁrst accommodation at the subject’s very
beginning.
Logics of various stripes have also tried to close this gap. In mod-
ern terms, the gap between having and drawing is the gap between
implication and inference. Think here of relevant and other forms of
paraconsistent logic. Although, in comparison to classical logic, these
have a more gap-closing character, even here the rules of inferences
remain unexecutable by beings like us. They are rules for the ideal
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reasoner. Aristotle closed the gap for human reasoners. No mainline
modern logic has yet to do the same. Syllogistic is the ﬁrst and most
successful gap-closing logic in the venerable history of the subject.
In marrying the logic of syllogistic consequence and the logic of
syllogistic inference, Aristotle is taking account of the cognitive ﬁnitude
of the human reasoner. The motive for this is entirely straightforward.
Logic in the narrow sense is a service industry. (After all, organon
means “tool”.) It is the premiss-consequence engine that serves the
further processes of logic in the broad sense. One of the dialectical
rules obliges the proponent to accede to all the syllogistic consequences
of any pair of propositions conveyed in answers to his opponent’s Yes-
No questions. One of the narrow logic’s central contributions to the
logic of arguments in the wide sense is that this dialectical obligation
is performable by psychologically real agents in real time.
All this matters greatly for the logic of arguments in the broad
sense. When one party is contending with another, and when success
or failure depends on whether the one party can get the other to see
that a given proposition has to be drawn in consequence of the other’s
own concessions, it is useless that the proposition in question does in
fact follow from them if the other is unable to draw it as such.
9. FOUNDATIONALITY
One of our questions is whether Aristotle’s logic is foundational for the
logic of games. It is, as we saw, two questions, one for the dialectical
logic, the other for syllogistic logic, which is dialectical logic’s theoret-
ical core. Let me begin with the core logic. The non-circularity con-
dition immunizes syllogistic reasoning against one source of question-
begging; modern logics of consequence typically do not. The premiss-
nonredundancy condition imposes on syllogistic consequence a rele-
vance condition similar to but stronger than the Anderson-Belnap full-
use sense of relevance Anderson & Belnap (1975). It also provides
for the nonmotonicity of syllogistic consequence, which is intolerant
of extra premisses. That same constraint, together with the premiss-
consistency requirement,38 constitutes the syllogistic logic as a limiting
case of a paraconsistent logic.39 The ban on multiple conclusions also
suggests a connection to intuitionism (Shoesmith & Smiley 1978, p.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Ancestor Worship in The Logic of Games 20
4). Taken together, the logic of syllogisms is a relevant, paraconsistent,
nonmonotonic logic, executable in dialectical and other dialogical con-
texts by beings like us in the actual here and now.
Except for themetaphor of being in Aristotle’s logical DNA, I haven’t
had much to say about this property of foundationality. It is now time
to say something more, beginning with nonmonotonicity. A conse-
quence relation is nonmonotonic when it is open to erasure in the face
of new premisses. Such relations are, let us say, “bustable”. Bustabil-
ity is a necessary feature of the syllogisticity of a consequence relation
and a necessary and sufﬁcient condition of the nonmonotonicity of a
consequence relation. Accordingly, we might propose that
Foundationality (First version): One system is in the logical
DNA of another when there is some property necessary for
a feature of the ﬁrst logic’s consequence relation that is
necessary and sufﬁcient for a feature of the second logic’s
consequence relation. The ﬁrst logic, then, is foundational
for the second.
It is easy enough to see that this connection obtains between the logic
of syllogisms and most of the mainstream logics of paraconsistency.
The failure of the ex falso quodlibet theorem is a necessary feature of the
syllogisticity of consequence and a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
of the paraconsistency of consequence.40 So the logic of syllogisms is
foundational for paraconsistent logics. Similarly, full use of premisses
is a necessary condition of syllogisticity and a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition of the full use relevance of Anderson’s and Belnap’s proofs
from hypotheses. The question we must now ask is whether, in this
same sense or anything convincingly like it, the logic of syllogisms is
foundational for the modern logic of games.
Of course, theFoundationality Principle is only a suggestion, scarcely
more than a passing idea. While it might plausibly enough capture one
sense of theory-foundationality, there may be other foundationalities
that exceed that principle’s reach. One thing we don’t want it to ob-
scure is the possibility that when, in respect of some shared property
or feature, one logic is foundational for another, this needn’t derive
from a common motivation. The paraconsistency property is an ex-
ample. Modern paraconsistentists will tolerate valid arguments with
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inconsistent premisses. What they will not tolerate are consequence
relations that take inconsistent premisses to the lengths of absolute in-
consistency. Accordingly, paraconsistent logicians place requisite con-
straints on consequence. The effect of these constraints is to keep lo-
calized inconsistencies in their place, not eliminate them altogether.
On the other hand, Aristotle would not tolerate inconsistent premisses
in the ﬁrst place. Inconsistently premissed valid arguments have cir-
cular counterposes. Since circular arguments aren’t syllogisms and the
contraposition relation is syllogisticity-preserving, neither is an incon-
sistently premissed argument a syllogism. Advocates of paraconsistent
logics cannot achieve their ends with classical consequence. But Aris-
totle conceivably could. Aristotle deals with his problem not by triﬂing
with the necessitation relation. He achieves it by restricting premiss-
eligibility. Both logics are paraconsistent in the sense that neither tol-
erates ex falso. But what they aren’t are logics whose respective para-
consistency has a shared motivation. We can say this more directly.
Whatever the similarities, Aristotle certainly didn’t set out to be a da
Costa or a Routley.
The same can be said of some of the other shared features. Con-
sider again the case of nonmonotonicity. Modern nonmonotonic logi-
cians widely assume that a consequence relation’s being nonmonotonic
denies it the property of being truth-preserving. Nonmonotonicity has
a quite different impact on syllogistic consequence. It shows that a
valid argument that happens to be a syllogism is not, upon addition of
new premisses, syllogisity-preserving. But it does not show, nor is it
likely to be true, that that same argument in those same circumstances
is not truth-preserving. This is a signiﬁcant difference, needless to say,
and it may lead some readers to think that the nonmonotonicities of
Aristotle and the modern non-deductive logician have quite different
motivations. In other words, Aristotle didn’t set out to be a Reiter or a
McCarthy or a McDermott and Doyle.
Perhaps it is not quite this way with relevance, whether expressed
as Aristotle’s premissory nonredundancy or as Anderson and Belnap’s
“full-use of hypotheses”. They both arise from a shared dislike of lazy
premisses, of propositions that are surplus to need. Yet the same could
not be said of Anderson and Belnap’s further notion of relevance, some-
times called the “content-containment” sense. In this instance, their
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motivation was to avoid irrelevance. Aristotle’s was to avoid redun-
dancy, never mind that a redundant premiss might well be relevant
in something very like the content-containment sense. Anderson and
Belnap worried about the damage done to the classical consequence
by the absence of concept-containment. Aristotle need have no such
worry about classical consequence. His is a worry about syllogisity.
And his interest in syllogisity is born of a desire to close the gap be-
tween consequence-having and consequence-drawing.
On its ﬁrst or weak version, Foundationality favours a positive ﬁnd-
ing on the foundational signiﬁcance of the syllogistic for the properties
under review. But if we elected to strengthen the principle by adding
a commonality of motivation requirement, the foundationality claim
would be considerably weakened, indeed pretty much wrecked.
This clearly matters for the game theoretic foundationality, or want
of it, in Aristotle’s work, and adds a complication. When we raise this
question, we raise it for two logics, not one; and we raise it for two
senses of foundationality, weak and strong. Perhaps we can simply
concede that the strong version will be the harder sell. But neither
should we think that the weak version is free-on-board.
10. GAME THEORETICALLY FOUNDATIONAL?
Let us start with the syllogistic. A game theoretic logic is a logic gov-
erned by logical and structural rules. The logical rules interpret the
logic’s connectives and quantiﬁers and such other logical expressions
as it might have. Structural rule are of organizational and strategic im-
port. They ﬁx conditions for the start of play, for transitions from one
stage to another, and they specify what counts as a winning strategy.
This makes possible the deﬁnition of properties such as validity and
proof. To qualify as game theoretic, a logic must be governed by rules
of both types. If a logic lacks logical rules in the sense intended here,
the question of its game theoreticity is settled in the negative. So we
must ask, “Is the logic of syllogisms governed by logical rules of the
kind speciﬁed in section 1?”
It is hardly plausible that Aristotle deﬁned his logical particles at
all, that is constructed a semantics for them. Still, it would be inter-
esting to know whether, had he done so, he would have been guided
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by game theoretic, as opposed to (say) truth conditional instincts. The
logical terms of the syllogistic vocabulary are “all”, “some”, “not” and
“is”.41 Thenonlogical expressions are terms, representable by schematic
letters. “All” and “some” preﬁxed to terms give a kind of quantiﬁcation
of the term. “Not” is term complementation, yielding further terms. It
can also preﬁx the quantiﬁer “all”. Terms admit of occurrence in both
subject and predicate place. Singular terms are banned: “Socrates” is
construed as “All that is Socrates” or “Every Socrates”.42 Quantiﬁers
occur only as preﬁxes of subject terms. “Is”, the copula, is ﬂanked by
quantiﬁcations of terms on the left and terms on the right, the results
of this are propositions. Categorical propositions are of four kinds “All
S are P” (A), “All S are not-P” (E), “Some S are P” (I), and “Some S are
not-P” (O). Propositions are linked by relations of immediate (not syl-
logistic) implication: A immediately implies I; E immediately implies
O. In addition, A and O are one another’s contradictories. A and E
are one another’s contraries. I and O are one another’s subcontraries.
If two propositions are contradictories one is true and the other false.
They are contraries when they can’t both be true but could both be
false. They are subcontraries when they can’t be false together and yet
could be true together. Since they hold between single propositions,
contradictoriness, contrariety and subcontrariety are not syllogistic re-
lations.
This essentially is the Aristotelian story of the logical expressions.
It is set out compactly and schematically in the Square of Opposition,
which arises not in the Topics and On Sophistical Refutations, but in the
Prior Analytics. In particular, the Square deﬁnes “is the contradictory
of” in such a way that instances are recognizable in the syntax of its re-
lata. When, as in dialectical arguments, the opponent’s role is to ﬁnd a
syllogism whose conclusion is the contradictory of the thesis under at-
tack, all needed information about contradictoriness is at hand. But it
would be a strain to say that this information has been produced game
theoretically. The point generalizes. Whatever the information Aris-
totle provides about term complementation, term quantiﬁcation, the
copula, and the logical relations of immediate or one-step necessitation
(which Aristotle also calls subsumption), contradictoriness, contrariety
and subcontrariety, there is in the DNA of these works no discernible
presence of a game theoretic sensibility, even in the weak sense of foun-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Ancestor Worship in The Logic of Games 24
dationality.
If this is right, the logic of the syllogism, whether in its compara-
tively ﬂedgling development in Topics and On Sophistical Refutations or
in its developed form in Prior and Posterior Analytics, fails to meet the
test of game theoretic foundational signiﬁcance. It is hardly surpris-
ing that this would be so. It is true that syllogisms were designed for
load-bearing work in dialectical arguments, but they were not them-
selves deﬁned dialectically. For the most part, the dialectical rules are
constraints. They offer scant positive guidance about, for example,
how to ask telling questions, that is, questions that yield the premisses
for a refutational kill. Syllogistic conditions, on the other hand, make
the property of syllogisity readily recognizable, if not actually decid-
able.43 If syllogisms are not dialogical entities, less so are they dialec-
tical entities. If they are not dialectical entities they can hardly qualify
as game theoretic entities. This sufﬁces to deprive the logic of the syl-
logism of any trace of a language of winning and losing. So the game
theoretical hypothesis loses traction here.
Some will say that this is all well and good for syllogistic logic,
but isn’t dialectical logic another matter entirely? Dialectical logic is a
logic in the broad sense. Like all logics in the broad sense, it is a logic
of arguing. In its dialectical variation, it is a logic of contestation, a
logic of interpersonal confrontation and rivalry. Whatever its details,
how could a dialectical logic not resonate with game theoretic purport?
There is procedural guidance in Aristotle’s dialectic, much of it con-
tained in Topics, book 8. There is, as we saw, one proponent and one
opponent. The proponent must defend a thesis by answering the op-
ponent’s question, posed one at a time. The questions must be clear
and straightforward, and should include what in law are called lead-
ing questions. Questions not meeting these conditions can be refused.
Questions must be fully answerable by an answer of Yes or No. The
content of such an answer must be expressible as a single categorical
proposition. Proponents must believe their answers to be true. Oppo-
nents are free to use the propositions conceded by their respondents,
but they need not believe them to be true. Answers may not be post-
poned. Answers may not be withdrawn. If a proponent doesn’t know
the answer to a question, the opponent and he must enter into an in-
struction argument that removes this ignorance. Since the opponent’s
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task is to attack the proponent’s thesis by producing a syllogism whose
conclusion is its contradictory, he should contrive his questions in ways
that facilitate that outcome. The argument ends when such a syllogism
is produced, or with the joint recognition of the opponent’s failure to
produce it. The ﬁrst ending is a win for the opponent. The second is a
win for the proponent, akin to the Scotch verdict of “not proven”.
The language of Aristotle’s dialectic is replete with the idioms of
games, of winning and losing, of procedural entitlements and prohibi-
tions, including those that help regulate the generation and selection of
premisses and conclusions. Aristotle’s dialectic is redolent with strate-
gic purport, and it is offered to real-life Athenians for the (somewhat
idealized) amelioration of real-life disputational turbulence. But the
question is whether, as they occur there, the idioms of game-playing
carry the sense, or some fair adumbration of it, that they possess in the
logics that descend from von Neumann and Morgenstern.
Let me repeat an earlier disclaimer. I said that one of the questions
I wasn’t interested in asking is whether a game theoretic interpretation
couldn’t be imposed on Aristotle’s dialectic. Consider a case. There are
logicians aplenty - John Venn being but one of them who interpret the
logic of syllogisms as a logic of classes. There is perhaps no harm in it.
But it is not very plausible to think that this was Aristotle’s interpreta-
tion. Less plausible still would be any suggestion that Aristotle’s postu-
lated classes carry the sense of Cantor’s sets. More brieﬂy: Nobody in
his right mind would think that a logic of syllogisms is foundational for
modern mathematics, that Cantorian set theoriticity was in Aristotle’s
logical DNA. The same, I think, must turn out to be true of Aristotle’s
dialectic in relation to the modern games of logic. This, if right, ful-
ﬁlls Marion’s prompting. But the scholarship thus occasioned would
provide no encouragement of Lorenzen’s conjecture and no answer to
Hodges’ question in Aristotle’s writings.
11. SEMANTIC INHERITANCE
There are two foundationality questions to judge, weak and strong, and
two logics with respect to make these judgements, syllogistic and di-
alectical. The gist of my remarks so far is that not even the weak foun-
dationality claim for game theoreticity gets much traction, not even in
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the dialectical logic. I take it as given that some readers will have found
this negative case to be unconvincing. Perhaps this is so. Perhaps the
negative thesis is just wrong. If the negative thesis is wrong, there must
be a case against it, at least in principle. I ﬁnd myself wondering what
such a case might look like. Perhaps it might look like this.
After some initial dissensus about the logical character of the syl-
logistic, modern opinion now favours a proof theoretic natural deduc-
tion interpretation according to which Aristotle’s logical particles are
deﬁned by proof rules. Consider, for example, the - as we would now
call it-universal quantiﬁer. In Prior Analytics A, 2, 24k 28 we have it
thus:
And we say that one term is predicated of all of another,
whenever nothing can be found of which the other cannot
be asserted.
Modern commentators, e.g. von Plato (2013), call this the “no-
counterexample” interpretation. The no-counterexample reading is
also discernible in passages of the Topics. At Θ, 2 157a 34 Aristotle
remarks:
If one has made an induction on the strength of several
cases and yet the answerer refuses to grant the universal
proposition, then it is fair to demand his objection.
This continues at Θ, 8, 160b 3:
... against the universal one should try to bring some ob-
jection: for to bring the argument to a standstill without
an objection, real or apparent, shows ill-temper
... If, moreover, he cannot even attempt a counter-proof
that is not true, far more likely is he to be thought to be
ill-tempered.
In other words, declining to give a counterexample to a disputed uni-
versal proposition is not quite cricket, not playing the game.
For logicians of game theoretic leanings, there are things to like in
these passages.44 For do they not support a game theoretic construal
of the no-counterexample interpretation of universality? My answer
is “Why would they?”. True, the passages from Topics are expressly
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concerned with how an opponent’s universal claim might properly be
countered. They advise the attacker on how to proceed against an op-
ponent’s claim when it possesses that logical form. We can say this an-
other way. Given the meaning of “All A are B”, the right way to proceed
against it is to try to ﬁnd a counterexample. But it does not follow, nor
is it at all obviously true, that the proposed rules for rebutting a univer-
sal proposition (as well as the rules for sustaining it) give the meaning
of “all”. The rules call for the production of a counterexample. They
do so precisely because the meaning of “all” requires a counterexample
for the rebuttal of “All A are B”. The meaning precedes the procedural
rule and, in so doing, gives it a coherent motivation. Game theoretic
logicians reverse this dependency. The prior fact, they say, is that this is
the right way of rebutting a universal claim, and the meaning that “all”
acquires is inherited from this and like rules. So we have here a clash
of two semantic inheritance claims.
Do we have a ready means of solving the semantic inheritance prob-
lem? If so, let us solve it and let the chips fall where they may. One
way of achieving this resolution, and of releasing those chips, would
be to show that a dialecticized veriﬁcationism is the right semantics for
our language.
Suppose that the dialecticized veriﬁcationism brieﬂy sketched in
section 3 were indeed the correct theory of meaning for “All A are B”.
Then we could say that the meaning of “all” is indeed constituted by
our dialectical practices. This would give us grounds for two different
claims. One is that the refutation advice offered in the early writings
honours the meanings of the sentences involved. The other is that those
very practices constitute their meaning. This is problematic. Consider
any treatment of logic whose provisions for “all” honours the mean-
ings that it actually possesses. By this I mean that nothing in the the-
ory’s quantiﬁcation rules is vitiated by what “all” actually means. The
quantiﬁcation rules “do no logical violence” to the meaning of “all”.
Consider in particular the model theoretic approach of Tarski. No one
seriously believes that Tarski’s provisions for the logical particles does
violence to what those expressions actually mean. But game theoretic
logicians think that Tarski’s theory of meaning is wrong - or anyhow
subpar. If it followed from the fact that Tarski’s logic does no violence
to the meanings of these expressions that Tarski’s semantics is a game
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theoretic one, then Tarski would be a game theoretic logician malgré
lui.
This brings us to the nub of the matter. Tarski wanted an accurate
and theoretically deep account of consequence and logical truth. To
achieve this he would specify a language with respect to which these
would be deﬁnable properties. Tarski’s characterization of them would
depend on a prior characterization of the language’s logical particles,
∼, ∀, and so on. Tarski’s project was, in effect, to say what “is a con-
sequence of” and “is a logical truth” mean. This, among other things,
would involve his giving a meaning to “∼”, “∀" and the like. It is com-
monly supposed that he couldn’t get the meanings of “consequence”
and “logical truth” right unless he also got the meanings of “∼” and
“∀” right, unless, that is to say, his “∼" actually means “not" and his “∀”
actually means “all". On the assumptions currently in play, Tarski did
not get the meanings of ‘∼’ and “∀” right. How, then, could we suppose
that he got the meaning of “consequence” right?
There is, as we now see, a critical difference between a logic that
does no violence to the meaning of “∀" and a logic that has the right
theory of meaning for “∀". A logic that does no violence to the meaning
of “∀" is one whose transformation rules for “∀" place -sentences in the
correct deductive relationships. For this to happen, it is not necessary
that the logic assign to “∀" the meaning it actually has. The reason
for this is that there is sufﬁcient similarity between the game-theoretic
“all” and the truth conditional “all” to slot “all”-sentences into the right
consequence-contexts.45
Perhaps a case can be made for the idea that the meaning that “all”
has in the narrow logic is given game-theoretically by the dialectical
rules of the broad logic in contexts such as Top. Θ, 2, 157a 34, 8,
160b3. If this were so, it would matter quite a lot that the narrow logic
is an essential constituent of the broad logic. This would help us see
that even if there is nothing in the narrow logic’s treatment of “all” that
sustains the suggestion of a game theoretic orientation, it could still be
true that in the narrow logic “all” occurs with the meaning given it in
the dialectical logic, and that the dialogical logic is, nearly enough, a
logic of games in the modern sense.
Yes, of course. But this is getting to be quite a gathering of “might”s.
Dialectical veriﬁcationism might be true. If so it might be that the pro-
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cedural rules of the Topics serve to ﬁx the meaning of “all”. This would
give us two cases to consider. One is that Aristotle himself believes
that dialectical veriﬁcationism is true and that his rules in the Topics
are meaning-constitutive. The other is that although dialectical veriﬁ-
cation is true, this is a truth of which Aristotle was entirely innocent.
In which case, the rules of the Topics do indeed ﬁx the meaning of “all”
notwithstanding that nothing of the sort was in Aristotle’s mind. I have
two things to say about this. The ﬁrst is that there is no credible evi-
dence either in Aristotle or the commentators that the founder of logic
was any kind of semantic veriﬁcationist. So case one is dismissible
without further pleadings. The second is that if in the Topics Aristo-
tle is a meaning-ﬁxer malgré lui, there is nothing to the strong idea
that Aristotle intended the Topics to be meaning-ﬁxing, as opposed to
strategically instructive. Accordingly, the idea that Aristotle’s logic is
game theoretically foundational loses a good deal of its steam. For we
would have it then that Aristotle’s logic is a game theoretic semantics
because the game theoretic approach is the right theory for “all” (etc.)
and Aristotle’s logic does not - any more than Tarski’s does - logically
violate the meanings that “all” (etc.) actually have. If this made Aris-
totle’s logic game theoretically foundational, how could it not do the
same for Tarski’s logic?
Notes
1See also Nash (1950a; 1950b; 1951).
2Kuhn (1997) contains the classical foundational papers. For good general coverage,
see Dixit et al. (1999). For mathematics, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) is excellent. Gintis
(2000) also covers mathematics but extends treatment to evolutionary game theory. La-
Casse and Ross (1994) connects game theory to micro and macroeconomics. Schelling
(1960; 1984; 2006) supply extensive coverage of social and political matters. Baird
et al. (1998) applies game theory to jurisprudence, and Poundstone (1992) converts
it to the strategic considerations that drove Cold War policy. Behavioural and experi-
mental links are explored by Kagel and Roth (1995). Evolutionary game theory arises
with Maynard Smith (1982), and its mathematical foundations are examined by (1995).
Connections to neureconomics are treated by Montague and Berns (2002), and the links
between game theory and behavioural economics and neuroeconomics are examined by
Ross (2005) with a cognitive science orientation. Game theoretic versions of Rawlsian-
ism are achieved by Binmore (2005). Skyrms (1996) gives a game theoretic treatment
of social contract theory.
3An important point of origin is Kuno Lorenz’s PhD dissertation (1961). Gale & Stew-
art (1953) connects the mathematics of game theory to set theory, and Henkin (1961)
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to logic. See further Hintikka (1968, 1973, 1996), Lorenzen & Lorenz (1978), Barth &
Krabbe (1982), Hodges (1985), Otto (1997), Rahman & Rückert (2001), Pauly & Parikh
(2003), Rahman & Tulenheimo (2009), Peters & Westerståhl (2006), Rahwan & Simari
(2009), van Benthem (2011), van Benthem et al. (2011), d’Avila Garcez et al. (to ap-
pear).
4Hodges writes “∃” (for “Eloise”), where others write “the proponent”. Similarly,
where Hodges writes “∀” (for “Abelard”), others write “opponent”.
5See Lorenzen (1960), p. 187.
6 “For a large class of cases - though not all - in which we employ the word ‘meaning’
it can be deﬁned thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (Wittgenstein
1953, p. 43).
7As with “game” we cannot ﬁnd “what is common to all these activities [= language
games] and what makes them into language or parts of language.” (Wittgenstein 1953,
p. 66).
8Waismann (1967/1979) reports conversations in December 1929 and January 1930
in which Wittgenstein avers that “the meaning of a proposition is its method of veriﬁca-
tion”.
9Or the tendentiously purported distinction between meaning and “cognitive” mean-
ing.
10I own to a slight reservation about over-extending the notion of game. The bloody
victory at Vimy Ridge was a battle, sure enough. But the suggestion that it was also
a game would have been a perilous one to make to the poor grunts who fought in it.
Similarly, ask a soldier whether he thinks that war-games are a game, and one risks an
unpleasant denial.
11For example, prisoners’ dilemma accounts of justice have an arguable presence in
the presocratic record, in the Socratic dialogues, and in later writers such as Lucretius.
See Denyer (1983).
12See for example Łukasiewicz (1957), Patzig (1968), Corcoran (1974), Lear (1980),
Thom (1981), and Boger (2004).
13See for example McCall (1963), McKirahan (1992) and Patterson (1995).
14So-called by Bochenski (1970). “Immature” is ambiguous between “developmen-
tally early” and “callow”. I am not sure which was Bochenski’s intent, but mine is the
former, not the latter. The logics here considered are “early”, in contrast to the “later”
developments of Prior and Posterior Analytics.
15See Woods (2001) and Woods & Hansen (2004). But here, too, “earlier” and “later”
have less a chronological signiﬁcance than a developmental one. Some scholars have
Posterior Analytics I as pre-dating both Topics and On Sophistical Refutations. Since this
part of Post. An. is itself a considerable anticipation of formal developments in Prior
Analytics, it is hard to see how the “early” logic could have been thought up in complete
independence of the “later” logic. See the editors’ introduction to the Loeb edition of On
Sophistical Refutations, and On-Coming-to-Be, and On the Cosmos.
16Hamblin (1970) and Barth & Krabbe (1982).
17Hintikka (1968, 1973, 1996, 1987, 1989, 1981).
18Hodges (2004, §3), Marion (2009, p. 7), and Tennant (1979).
19I might note that Marion himself has developed two answers to Hodges’ unvoiced
question. One is worked up in an interesting adaptation of a Dummett-Brandom seman-
tics (2009, pp. 19-23). The other is his contribution to this Yearbook. See also Marion &
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Rückert (forthcoming).
20Thus Quine: “Logic is an ancient subject, but since 1879 it’s been a great one.”
(Quine 1950/1982, preface).
21Refutation arguments are not original to Aristotle. They are preﬁgured in the So-
cratic notion of elenchus. See Robinson (1953), Vlastos (1982) and Tuozzo (2011).
22Aristotle’s deﬁnition, early and late, provides that: “A syllogism rests on certain
propositions such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than
what has been stated, through what has been stated.” (Soph. Ref. 165a 1-3) For an
examination of whether structures so deﬁned are able to bear my interpretation of them,
the reader may wish to consult Woods (2001) or more brieﬂy Woods & Irvine (2004).
Some of my claims are open to dispute. For example, against the two-premiss condi-
tion, there are instances in which Aristotle himself cites a one-premiss argument as a
syllogism. See Hitchcock (2000) for details. My view is that they are slips rather than
counterexamples.
23 “Not-T” is a notational convenience of my own. It is not intended to reﬂect the
logical form of T’s contradictory, but only to denote it whatever its form. So, for example,
if T is the proposition “All A are B”, then not-T is “Some A are not B”.
24A notable exception is Locke (1970).
25While this is the standard view of scholars of the period, some see in Plato’s Charmides
an account of positive elenchi. (Tuozzo 2011).
26In a coinage of (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1881, 1883).
27This is not to overlook the logic of immediate inference, more accurately described as
the logic of single-premiss implication. Of course, no one-step implication is a syllogism.
Syllogisms must have more than one premiss. Aristotle thought that valid single-pre-
miss arguments were question-begging (Top. 162b 34). It is therefore more accurate to
characterize Aristotle’s notion of logic as a family of theories of implication deﬁned over
arguments in the narrow sense, not excluding single-premiss arguments. For present
purposes, however, the dialectic-syllogistic distinction will sufﬁce.
28Aristotle sets out the scope of On Sophistical Refutations in these words: “First we
must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and rivals
to the death. These are ﬁve in number, refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and ﬁfthly
to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling - i.e. to constrain him to repeat
himself a number of times: or to produce the appearance of each of these things without
the reality” (165b 12).
29This requires a slight amendment. When considering sophistical refutations of the
ignoratio elenchi sort, Aristotle allows that the argument at hand might well be a syl-
logism derived from dialectically allowable premisses, but whose conclusion fails to be
the contradictory of the thesis of the refuter’s opponent. In which case, the paralogismos
would be mistaking the non-contradictory of a proposition for its contradictory.
30This is also part of the motivation of the requirement that syllogisms not have mul-
tiple conclusions.
31This idea, adjusted to modern fallacy theory, is developed in Woods (2013).
32See Hamblin (1970), and again Hintikka (1987). For a contrary view see Woods &
Hansen (1997), and Woods & Hansen (2004). Hintikka (1997) is a rejoinder to Woods
& Hansen (1997).
33Let me hastily mention a possible explanation of this. In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle
produces an almost sound proof of the perfectability, a proof whose repair lies within
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ready reach Corcoran (1972). A syllogism is perfect when its syllogisity is obvious, when
it wears its syllogisity on its face. The perfectability proof provides that any syllogism
whose syllogisity is not immediately apparent can be shown to be a syllogism in a way
that uses rules whose legitimacy is in turn immediately apparent. Therefore, the per-
fectability proof is a principled means for regulating the distinction between syllogisms
and non-syllogisms. If this is right, the fallacies problem has a solution in the Prior Ana-
lytics. But it is a solution that bears no essential connection to the fallacies on Aristotle’s
list.
34survey of the history of fallacy theory in western logic can be found in Woods (2012).
35At a certain level of abstraction and generality this historical observation is true.
Closer to the ground, however, events take on a degree of complexity. In 1970, Ham-
blin would challenge the logic community to revive the fallacies programme. An early
response was the so-called Woods-Walton Approach advanced in a series of some twenty–
ﬁve papers published in the period 1972-1985. A distinctive feature of the Woods-Walton
Approach was its attempt to adopt various nonclassical logics - notably intuitionistic logic
but not excluding the formal logics of dialogue - to capture various properties peculiar to
the various fallacies. Most of these papers are collected in Woods & Walton (1989/2007).
Of its nineteen chapters, ﬁve ﬁrst appeared in mainstream logic journals and four oth-
ers in leading journals of technically oriented analytic philosophy. Another development
of note, also in some measure a response to Hamblin, was the rise of informal logic,
so-called. Although not universally instantiated, by far the dominant methodological
emphasis of this movement is its eschewal of - indeed its hostility toward - formal meth-
ods in the theory of argument. With scant exceptions, informal logicians publish their
work in niche journals such as Informal Logic. The motivation and development of this
approach to argument is well described in Johnson (1996). This is not, I repeat, to over-
look the robust attachment of formal developments in dialogue logic to the analysis of
argument. But comparatively little of that work is devoted to the fallacies. The fallacies,
if anything, are an afterthought.
36See, for example, Harman (1970). Actually Harman is an extreme separatist. He
reserves the name of logic for theories of consequence, and withholds it from theories of
inference or consequence-drawing. Harman, like Quine, is a logical monist, and a strict
conservative. He thinks that the only logic that deserves logic’s name is classical ﬁrst
order logic Harman (1972). Hintikka, on the other hand, is a moderate separatist. In his
information-seeking interrogative logics, a distinction between deﬁnitory and strategic
rules is fundamental. Roughly speaking, the deﬁnitory rules serve the needs of con-
sequence-having, and the strategic uses govern the business of consequence-drawing.
Moderate separatism is also proposed by Woods & Walton (1989/2007). Still, gap-clos-
ing normative idealization remains much the preferred option. For reservations, see
Gabbay & Woods (2003) and Woods (2013, chapter 2).
37Aristotle makes this claim in only two places, On Interpretation, 17a, 13 and 19 ff,
24, and nowhere mounts a defence of it. Here is Robin Smith on this point: “ ...since
Aristotle thought that all propositions could be analyzed as categoricals, he regarded the
syllogistic as the theory of validity in general.” (Smith, 1995, p. 35). I agree with Smith
with regard to the reduction claim, but part company from him as regards “validity in
general”. There is no such theory in Aristotle’s early writings.
38The premiss consistency requirement comes about in two ways. First, Aristotle al-
lows for a syllogisity-preserving operation - let’s call it argumental contraposition - ac-
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cording to which any syllogism 〈A, B, C〉 has an equivalent contrapose 〈A, not-C, not-B〉.
Consider now the circular argument 〈A, B, A〉. Clearly not a syllogism, neither is its
contrapose 〈A, not-A, not-B〉. The second source of the premiss consistency requirement
is that any argument whose premisses are one another’s contraries or subcontraries will
fail the three-terms condition on syllogisms.
39The theorem ex falso quodlibet asserts that a contradiction implies any statement
whatever. In a paraconsistent logic, inconsistent premisses entail only proper subsets of
them. In a syllogistic logic, the question of omniderivability doesn’t arise. Syllogistic
logics refuse admission to inconsistent premisses. The requirement that there not be
multiple conclusions is an adumbration of one aspect of intuitionism.
40More accurately, some writers see paraconsistency as the failure of the non-contradi-
ction principle to be a theorem. Many others see it as the failure of contradictions to
trivialize. For others still, paraconsistency is the failure of some inconsistent premiss sets
to trivialize. But the dominant opinion is that the failure of ex falso is necessary and
sufﬁcient for paraconsistency. See Brown (2007, p. 97, n. 3).
41 “No S is P” is recastable as “All S is not-P”.
42An anticipation of (Quine (1948).
43Given the support of the perfectability proof of the Prior Analytics. See again Corco-
ran (1972) and also his (1974). As noted, an argument is a perfect syllogism if and only
if it is obviously a syllogism. An argument is an imperfect syllogism if and only if it is
a syllogism but not obviously so, whose conclusion is derivable by the law of contradic-
tion, the laws of propositional conversion, the reductio law and further derivation rules
that are obviously, i.e. perfectly, syllogistically valid. Some of the perfectability rules are
clearly not syllogistic rules. Wouldn’t this violate the requirement that deductive rea-
soning be syllogistic? No. There is no such requirement. For, recall, syllogisms were
purpose-built for the resolution of dialectical wrangles. Even so, the perfectability proofs
contain premisses which clearly are not categorical propositions. Doesn’t this contradict
the categorical reduction thesis? Not knowing its proof, it is hard to say. If there were
a successful proof, there would be room to allow the on-sufferance use of premisses in
non-categorical form. But the likelier option is that the thesis is so deeply untrue that
Aristotle is forced to override it at the apex of his achievement of logic’s ﬁrst logical
breakthrough.
44See here Marion & Rückert (forthcoming).
45Let me note in passing a more recent case in point, and a more contentious one.
FDE, the logic of ﬁrst degree entailment is a logic of relevance Routley & Routley (1985).
In the semantics of FDE “not A” is true just in case A is, not false, but possibly false. FDE
has a large fan-base. Many serious-minded logicians think that FDE gets “consequence”
right or at least that its provisions for “consequence” are strongly supportable. But hardly
any of these same logicians think that FDE gets “not” right. They think that there is no
sense of negation which their “not” actually captures. Instead, they think that in getting
consequence right they got negation wrong, on purpose so to speak. Thus many of
FDE’s supporters concede that FDE lacks an operator that is recognizable as negation an
exception is Restall (1999). But not even its detractors say, or need say, that this makes
FDE’s consequence relation equally unrecognizable. What this suggests is that it is not
the business of logic to get “not” right. Its business is to give to “not” a treatment that
facilitates its getting “consequence” right. That is, it is logic’s business not to get “not”
so wrong that it can’t get “consequence” right.The idea of a would-be logic’s making
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unrecognizable its purported notion of negation arises with Quine’s dismissive discussion
of dialethic logic and its espousal of “an occasional sentence and its negation as true”.
(Quine, 1970/1986, p. 81).
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